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Abstract
Optimal control theory is ubiquitous in mathematical sciences and engineering. However, in a
classroom setting we barely move beyond linear quadratic regulator problems, if at all. In this
work, we demystify the necessary conditions of optimality associated with nonlinear optimal
control by deriving them from first principles. We also present two numerical schemes for
solving these problems. Moving forward, we present an extension of inverse optimal control,
which is the problem of computing a cost function with respect to which observed state and
control trajectories are optimal. This extension helps us to handle systems which are subjected
to state and/or control constraints. We then generalize the methodology of optimal control
theory to solve constrained non-zero sum dynamic games. Dynamic games are optimization
problems involving several players who are trying to optimize their respective cost functions
subject to constraints. We present a novel method to compute Nash equilibrium associated
with a game by combining aspects from direct and indirect methods of solving optimal control
problems. Finally, we study constrained inverse dynamic games, which is a problem analogous
to constrained inverse optimal control method. Here, we show that an inverse dynamic game
problem can be decoupled and solved as an inverse optimal control problem for each of the
players individually. Throughout the work, examples are provided to demonstrate efficacy of
the methods developed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this introductory chapter, we present the motivation behind our work, the objectives of this
work including original contributions of the author, and the outline of the work.
1.1 Motivation
Optimal control theory as developed in early part of the 20th century has seen an enormous
progress in areas as diverse as space exploration [1,2], chemical reactors [3,4], vehicle navigation
[5], among others. Several numerical methods [6], such as direct methods [7,8], indirect methods
[9, 10], dynamic programming [11, 12], etc., have emerged over the years to accurately solve
optimal control problems. Although the algorithms in use are plenty, a look at the published
literature can easily intimidate a beginner. There is therefore a clear need to completely spell
out these algorithms in such a way that a novice can be able to read the work and apply to their
own research.
Inverse optimal control (IOC), as the name suggests, is the inverse problem of the optimal
control theory. Whereas a forward problem (or, just an optimal control problem) is that of
generating optimal state and control trajectories by minimizing a certain cost function subjected
to constraints, the inverse problem is that of trying to infer an underlying cost function given
optimal (usually locally optimal) control and state trajectory data. The applications of IOC
have enormous potential in the field of robot learning, autonomous navigation among others
[13–15]. While some methods exist to solve IOC problems, it is either the case that they use
1
2techniques from machine learning and do not take advantage of elegant mathematical framework
provided by control theory [16], or they deal with only linear systems [17], or they involve only
unconstrained systems [18], among other things. Therefore, we need a control theoretic method
to address these shortcomings.
Dynamic games can be thought of as an extension to optimal control. While problems in
optimal control are based in single objective optimization, dynamic games are typically multi-
objective optimization problems with several players in cooperative or non-cooperative setting
trying to optimize their respective cost functions [19, 20]. Dynamic games have found applica-
tions in defense [21, 22], biological systems [23], among others. Compared to optimal control,
less work has been done in the area of dynamic games with a control-theoretic view in mind.
While problems have been solved in the case of linear quadratic dynamic games [24,25], as well
as some nonlinear dynamic games [26], solution of constrained non-zero sum nonlinear dynamic
games can hardly be found in the literature. This shows a clear need of solution strategies to
solve such problems.
Inverse dynamic games are analogous to IOC problems, except multiple players are involved.
Of all the three areas mentioned above (i.e., optimal control theory, inverse optimal control, and
dynamic games), this area has the least presence in the literature. While some work in inverse
differentials games exists such as [27–29], none of them deal with the problem of constrained
nonlinear non-zero sum dynamic games. This necessitates a need to address this deficiency.
1.2 Thesis statement
The unifying theme of this work is based in solving constrained problems in forward and inverse
optimal control using control-theoretic methods, and then generalizing these methods to solve
problems in dynamic and inverse dynamic games.
1.3 Objectives
To accomplish the goal as put forth in the thesis statement, the present work will begin by de-
riving necessary conditions of optimality for constrained optimal control problems using calculus
of variations. As such, these necessary conditions can only be used to solve limited problems in
3control theory analytically. In the subsequent chapter, details will be provided for implemen-
tation of numerical methods to solve more general nonlinear problems. Use of optimal control
methods is important because the solution to optimal control problems will be used to solve
constrained inverse optimal control problems. A novel algorithm, based on necessary optimality
conditions and residual minimization, will be presented to solve these inverse optimal control
problems. Another novel algorithm, based again on necessary optimality conditions, will be
presented to solve constrained non-zero sum dynamic games. Finally, it will be shown that an
inverse dynamic game problem can be reduced to decoupled problems in residual minimization
of individual players, which can then be solved using the method employed for solving inverse
optimal control problems.
1.4 Contribution
1.4.1 Major Contribution
• Pedagogical introduction to solving nonlinear optimal control problems using classical
collocation method (trapezoidal) and state-of-the-art pseudospectral method (PS method)
• A general nonlinear optimal control solver with capabilities such as:
– choice between pseudospectral (Legendre) or local discretization (Trapezoidal)
– nonlinear path constraints on states and/or control variables (equality/inequality)
– isoperimetric constraints (or, integral constraints)
– bounds on states and/or control variables
– running (Lagrange) and terminal (Mayer) costs
– shortest time problems
– easy extension to multiphase problems
– accuracy comparable to popular open source softwares such as PSOPT
• Solution of constrained inverse optimal control problems
• Solution of differential games using semi-direct method
• Solution of inverse differential games
41.4.2 Minor Contribution
• A unified framework for solving constrained initial value problems (IVP), boundary value
problems (BVP) and two-point boundary value problems (TPBVP)
• Derivation of robot kinematics and dynamics of a non-planar 3 DOF robot and its control
using classical and modern methods
1.5 Outline of Work
The chapters in this work are described below:
Chapter 2 presents relevant literature in forward and inverse optimal control as well as
forward and inverse dynamic games. It also includes a description of a 3 DOF robot model,
which is a full nonlinear robot model simulated by the author to be used in later chapters.
Chapter 3 presents nonlinear optimal control problem and derives necessary conditions of
optimality using calculus of variations. These conditions are then used on an LQR problem to
derive the closed-loop optimal controller.
Chapter 4 is presents two numerical methods for solving nonlinear optimal control problems.
These methods are described in a pedagogical manner and are applied to three example problems.
Chapter 5 talks about inverse optimal control problem and develops a general framework to
solve these problems in the light of corresponding forward problems being constrained. It also
provides simulation results to show the efficacy of the method.
Chapter 6 presents constrained dynamic game problem and provides a novel way to compute
Nash equilibrium of nonzero-sum games. Simulations are provided to show the method in action.
Chapter 7 presents inverse dynamic game problem and provides a method to solve it using
an extension of inverse optimal control method. It also provides simulations to support the
theoretical developments.
Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks on the methods developed in the work. It also
discusses the current shortcomings of the various methods presented in the work and potential
avenues of future work.
Appendix A provides a glossary of major technical terms used throughout the work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review and
Background
In this chapter we review important literature in the field of optimal and inverse optimal control,
as well as dynamic and inverse dynamic games.
2.1 Related Work
Optimal control problems can be seen as problems in trajectory optimization. There are several
ways in which such problems can be formulated [6,30,31]. Classical methods in optimal control
such as trapezoidal or Hermite-Simpson have been in use for some time and have extensive
literature [32, 33]. While pseudospectral methods were first used in the solution of partial
differential equations in the 1970s in the works of Orszag et al. [34,35], pseudospectral methods,
as used in optimal control theory, only made their appearance in the mid 1990s in the works of
Elnagar et al. [36, 37], Ross et al. [38–40], among others.
Inverse optimal control (IOC), as the name suggests, is the inverse problem whereby we
impute a cost function from given observations. Inverse optimal control, and the closely related
field of inverse reinforcement learning, have found many applications in areas such as under-
standing human locomotion [13], control of quadcopters [16], and autonomous navigation [41].
IOC has its early beginnings in the work of Kalman [42]. The method has a very close
5
6analogue in the machine learning community, and is called inverse reinforcement learning. Much
work has been done in the field of inverse reinforcement learning since the early 2000s. A max-
margin algorithm was presented in [16] to recover an unknown reward function from observations
of a Markov decision process. The method was eventually used to autonomously navigate a
helicopter using trajectories generated by human expert. Another widely studied technique
is the maximum entropy reinforcement learning algorithm from [41]. The algorithm utilizes
the principle of maximum entropy to systematically select a policy that is consistent with the
observed trajectory data.
Inverse reinforcement learning methods based on likelihood optimization were applied to
imitation learning problems in [43]. They applied the method to predict the turn decisions
of taxi drivers. Inverse optimal control was used by [13] to learn human motion trajectories.
They posed the problem as a bi-level optimization in which they solved the optimal control
problem for a given set of parameters in an inner loop and minimized the deviations between
computed and observed trajectories in an outer loop. Inverse optimal control based on local
approximation of the reward function was examined in [15]. Their method involved optimizing
a likelihood function which was derived by modelling expert’s behavior using maximum entropy
inverse reinforcement learning. This work utilized efficient local approximations of the reward
functions, which enabled the method to scale to larger problems than is typically possible for
inverse optimal control methods.
More closely related to the present work, [17] developed a method for estimating cost func-
tions based on residual minimization of observations using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions. The resulting optimization problem is convex and they successfully used it to learn
the underlying cost function. Even in cases in which the forward problem was not convex, the
method was able to approximate the true cost function using a convex cost function which was
capable of mimicking the observed behavior. The residual minimization approach of [17] was ex-
tended in [18]. This work utilized a control-theoretic framework to solve inverse optimal control
problems for deterministic nonlinear systems. They demonstrated that control costs could be
calculated from a quadratic optimization problem derived from Pontryagin’s minimum principle.
Inverse optimization for constrained discrete-time problems was studied in [44, 45], also based
on minimizing a residual from the KKT conditions. The work in [44] also examined the effects
of unmodeled dynamics and uncertain observations and proposed a bounded error approach to
7inverse optimization.
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives interact over time [19,24].
Dynamic games have many applications including pursuit-evasion [46], active-defense [47, 48],
economics [49], human interaction [50, 51], autonomous driving [52], and the smart grid [53].
Compared to centralized problems, however, less is known for game-theoretic settings. For
cooperative problems, a method similar to the max-margin method from [16] was proposed
in [54]. The maximum entropy method was extended to Markov games [55]. While these methods
have a potential advantage of being model free, they also do not exploit model information when
it is available.
Inverse dynamic games are important because they can help provide useful information
about the intent of the players based on their actions. This particular area of investigation is
still developing with some recent advances that include [27,28].
Figure 2.1: A robot manipulator with coordinate frames attached
82.2 Elbow Manipulator
For the purposes of present work, a 3 DOF non-planar robot (as shown in Figure 2.1) will be
used as one of the several dynamic systems for simulation studies. This robot is sometimes also
called as an elbow manipulator. While all other example problems to be presented in this work
are either straightforward to model (using Newtonian or Lagrangian mechanics) or borrowed
from literature, this elbow manipulator is completely modeled (in the joint space) by the author
and includes modeling of often neglected Coriolis term. The kinematics of the robot is described
using Denavit-Hartenberg parameters. This model is thoroughly tested using classical control
schemes like PID control for point to point as well as trajectory tracking control. As such, it
will serve as one of the most sophisticated dynamic system in this work. The idea for this robot
(including Figure 2.1) is borrowed from [56].
Chapter 3
Optimal Control
Optimal control (OC) is a branch of modern control theory in which a sequence of control inputs
are generated by solving some optimization problem. These control inputs are then guaranteed
to be (locally) optimal with respect to some cost function. In this chapter, necessary conditions
of optimality will be derived from first principles using calculus of variations. An application of
these necessary conditions is used to derive closed-loop optimal controller for LQR problem.
3.1 Constrained Optimal Control
The problem of optimal control is to find a control law for a given dynamic system such that a
certain performance criterion is met. In its mathematical form, the problem therefore is to find
the control trajectory u(t), the state trajectory x(t), to minimize the cost function
9
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min
u
J [u] =ϕ[x(tf ), tf ] +
∫ tf
t0
L[t, (x(t), u(t)]dt
subject to the dynamic constraint,
x˙(t) = f [t, x(t), u(t)], t ∈ [t0, tf ]
path constraint,
hL <= h[t, x(t), u(t)] <= hU , t ∈ [t0, tf ]
bound constraints,
uL <= u(t) <= uU , t ∈ [t0, tf ]
xL <= x(t) <= xU , t ∈ [t0, tf ]
and, boundary conditions,
φ[t0, x(t0), tf , x(tf )] = 0
(3.1)
where, formally [57],
– u ∈ U , x ∈ X
– (U, X) are space of admissible functions (for ex., u ∈ C1(Ω), x ∈ C1(Ω), where C1(Ω)
is the space of continuous functions)
– Ω ⊂ IRn, n ≥ 1 is a bounded open set, a point in Ω is denoted by
t = (t1, ..., tn)
– u : Ω→ IRnu , nu ≥ 1, u = (u1, ..., unu)
– x : Λ→ IRnx , nx ≥ 1, x = (x1, ..., xnx), and hence
∇x =
(
∂xj
∂ti
)1≤j≤nx
1≤i≤n
∈ IRnx×n ∴ x˙ =
(
∂xj
∂ti
)1≤j≤nx
i=1
∈ IRnx
– ϕ : IRnx × Ω→ IR
– L : Ω× IRnx × IRnu → IR
– f : Ω× IRnx × IRnu → IRnx
– h : Ω× IRnx × IRnu → IRnh
– φ : Ω× IRnx × IRnu → IRnφ
However, less formally, we use the following simpler definitions
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– u : [t0, tf ]→ IRnu
– x : [t0, tf ]→ IRnx
– ϕ : IRnx × IR→ IR
– L : [t0, tf ]× IRnx × IRnu → IR
– f : [t0, tf ]× IRnx × IRnu → IRnx
– h : [t0, tf ]× IRnx × IRnu → IRnh
– φ : IRnx × IR× IRnx × IR→ IRnφ
Here, nx, nu, nh, nφ represent the dimensionality of the state vector, control vector, path
constraint vector, and boundary conditions, respectively.
The cost function, J, expressed by (3.1) is said to be in Bolza form. The cost function
without the integral term is said to be in Mayer form, and with the integral term alone is said
to be in Lagrange form.
3.2 Necessary Conditions of Optimality
3.2.1 Problem Formulation
Let us simplify the very general problem stated in the previous section to only consider free
endpoint and fixed final time problems. We also lump the inequality constraints in a single
constraint vector g(t). The problem can now be formally stated as:
min
u
J(u) = φ(tf , xf ) +
∫ tf
t0
L(t, x(t), u(t)) dt
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
g(t, x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0
x(0) = xstart
x(tf ) = xfree
(3.2)
Notation:
x(t) ∈ Rnx is the state vector
u(t) ∈ Rnu is the control vector
12
J(u) is the scalar cost function
L(t, x(t), u(t)) : R× Rnx × Rnu → R is the running cost
f(t, x(t), u(t)) : R× Rnx × Rnu → Rn is the system dynamics
g(t, x(t), u(t)) : R× Rnx × Rnu → Rs is the mixed inequality constraint vector
Assumptions:
We make some assumptions on the optimal control problem for it to be well posed and amenable
to the analysis of this paper.
1) f [t, x(t), u(t)] is assumed to be continuous in time and differentiable in state and control
variables.
2) ∇xf [t, x(t), u(t)] is continuous in both time and control variables.
3) The control variable is at least piecewise continuous in time.
4) The running cost L[t, x(t), u(t)] is differentiable in both state and control variables, and
the terminal cost φ(tf , xf ) is differentiable in states.
5) The mixed inequality constraint, g[t, x(t), u(t)] is continuous in time, state and control
variables and differentiable in state and control variables.
3.2.2 Derivation of Necessary Conditions of Optimality
To discuss the problem of optimal control under mixed inequality constraints, we first define
the Hamiltonian, H and the Lagrangian, L as follows (for brevity, we will, at times, omit the
time dependence of variables in the equations to follow):
H (t, x, u, p) = L(t, x, u) + pT f(t, x, u) (3.3)
L (t, x, u, p, µ) =H (t, x, u, p) + µT g(t, x, u) (3.4)
where p ∈ Rnx is an adjoint variable and µ ∈ Rk is a multiplier. We also define the state-
dependent control region as
Λ(t, x) = {u ∈ Rnu |g(t, x, u) ≤ 0} ⊂ Rnu (3.5)
We now present some mathematical background which we will make use of in deriving the
necessary optimality conditions.
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Mathematical Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Variation): A variation δx(t), in the context of calculus of variations, is defined
as difference between perturbed trajectory, x(t) and nominal solution trajectory, x∗(t), i.e.,
δx(t) = x(t)− x∗(t)
Definition 2 (Increment of a functional): Given a functional F (x), the increment of a
functional, ∆F , is defined as:
∆F = F (x(t) + δx(t))− F (x(t))
=
(
∂F
∂x
)
δx+
1
2!
(
∂2F
∂x2
)
(δx2) + . . .
= δF + δ2F + . . .
Definition 3 (First variation of a functional): Given a functional F (u, v), the first variation
of the functional, δF (u, v), in the neighborhood of (u,v), is the first order term in the increment
of a variation ∆F (u, v):
δF (u, v) =
∂F (u, v)
∂u
δu+
∂F (u, v)
∂v
δv
We now present a few properties of a variation, a lemma, and a theorem, all without proof,
which we would make use of later to derive the necessary optimality conditions.
Properties of a variation
1. δ(x(t) + y(t)) = δx(t) + δy(t)
2. ddt (δx(t)) = δ(x˙(t))
3.
∫ tf
t0
δx(t) dt = δ(
∫ tf
t0
x(t) dt)
Lemma: (Fundamental Lemma of Calculus of Variations) If for every continuous function
h(t), it is the case that ∫ tf
t0
h(t)δx(t) dt = 0
where the variation δx(t) is continuous in t ∈ [t0, tf ], then
h(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ [t0, tf ]
14
Theorem: (Lagrange Multiplier Theorem)
Let x∗ be a local minimum of
min
x
f(x)
s.t. h(x) = 0
Also, assume that the constraint gradients ∇h1(x∗), ...,∇hm(x∗) are linearly independent (con-
straint qualification). Then, there exists a unique vector λ∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
m), called a Lagrange
multiplier vector, such that
∇f(x∗) +
m∑
i=1
λ∗i∇hi(x∗) = 0
Although this is a necessary condition of optimality, it is not the only condition. We also need
x∗ to satisfy the condition h(x∗) = 0. The two conditions can be repackaged elegantly in terms
of a Lagrangian function defined as
L(x, λ) = f(x) +
m∑
i=1
λihi(x)
The necessary conditions can now be stated compactly as
∇xL(x∗, λ∗) = 0 ∇λL(x∗, λ∗) = 0
3.2.3 Necessary Conditions of Optimality
We are now in a position to state a formulation of Pontryagin’s minimum principle that is used
when dealing with optimal control problems with mixed inequality constraints. The formal
statement of the theorem is presented in [58] and we paraphrase and prove its weak form here.
Theorem: Let (x∗, u∗) be an optimal pair for (3.2) over a fixed interval [0,T], such that
u∗ is right-continuous with left-hand limits and the linear independence constraint qualification
(LICQ) holds for every triple {t, x∗(t), u(t)}, t ∈ [0,T] with u ∈ Ω(t, x∗(t)), then there exists
a costate trajectory p(t) mapping [0,T] into Rnx , piecewise continuous multiplier function µ(t)
mapping [0,T] into Rns and the following conditions hold almost everywhere:
u∗(t) = argmin
u∈Λ(t,x∗)
H (t, x∗(t), u, p(t)) (3.6)
∂L ∗
∂u
(t, x, u, p(t), µ(t)) = 0 (3.7)
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p˙(t) = −∂L
∗
∂x
(t, x, u, p, µ)(
∂φ
∂x
− p
)∣∣∣∣∣
tf
t0
= 0
(3.8)
µ(t) ≥ 0 (3.9)
µ(t)T g∗(t, x, u) = 0 (3.10)
Note: A symbol with an asterisk as a superscript either indicates an optimal variable or indicates
evaluation of the symbol with respect to the optimal pair (x∗, u∗).
Proof: The terminal cost φ(tf , xf ) in J(u), can be written using Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus, as
φ(tf , xf )−:
0
φ(t0.x0) =
∫ tf
t0
dφ(t, x)
dt
dt (3.11)
where we set φ(t0, x0) to zero, by assumption.
Also, let us add slack variable λ to the inequality constraint and set
g(t, x, u, λ) = g(t, x, u) + λ2 = 0 (3.12)
As a result, we can modify our original cost function J(u) to J(u) and reformulate (3.2) as:
min
u
J(u) =
∫ tf
t0
[dφ(t, x)
dt
+ L(t, x, u)
]
dt
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
g(t, x(t), u(t), λ(t)) = 0
x(0) = xstart
x(tf ) = free
(3.13)
Using Lagrange Multiplier Theorem, the augmented cost function can be written as
Ja(u, p, µ, λ) =
∫ tf
t0
[dφ(t, x)
dt
+ L(t, x, u) + pT (f(t, x, u)− x˙) + µT g(t, x, u, λ)
]
dt (3.14)
If (u∗, p∗, µ∗, λ∗) is a locally optimal solution to the minimization of (3.14), then it must be
the case that in the vicinity of the solution, any small perturbations in (u, p, µ, λ) should satisfy
the following condition
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Ja(u
∗, p∗, µ∗, λ∗) ≤ Ja(u∗ + ∆u, p∗ + ∆p, µ∗ + ∆µ, λ∗ + ∆λ)
= Ja(u
∗, p∗, µ∗, λ∗) +
∂Ja
∂u
δu+
∂Ja
∂p
δp
+
∂Ja
∂µ
δµ+
δJa
∂λ
δλ+ higher order terms
(3.15)
Inequality (3.15) holds if
∂Ja
∂u
= 0
∂Ja
∂p
= 0
∂Ja
∂µ
= 0
∂Ja
∂λ
= 0
(3.16)
(3.16) can be written as first variation in cost function Ja(u, p, µ, λ) as,
δJa(u, p, µ, λ) = 0 (3.17)
(3.17) is therefore a necessary condition for optimality and will be used in proof of the
theorem.
Using the definition of total derivative, (3.14) can be expanded to
Ja(u, p, µ, λ) =
∫ tf
t0
{[∂φ
∂t
+
∂φ
∂x
x˙
]
+ L(t, x, u) + pT (f(t, x, u)− x˙) + µT g(t, x, u, λ)
}
dt (3.18)
Letting
L(t, x, x˙, u, p, µ, λ) =
{[∂φ
∂t
+
∂φ
∂x
x˙
]
+ L(t, x, u) + pT (f(t, x, u)− x˙) + µT g¯(t, x, u, λ)
}
results in
Ja(u, p, µ, λ) =
∫ tf
t0
L(t, x, x˙, u, p, µ, λ) dt (3.19)
To minimize (3.19), we set its first variation to zero (see (3.17)) to get
δJa(u, p, µ, λ) = δ
∫ tf
t0
L(t, x, x˙, u, p, µ, λ) dt = 0 (3.20)
Using Property 3 of a variation,
δ
∫ tf
t0
L(t, x, x˙, u, p, µ, λ) dt =
∫ tf
t0
δL(t, x, x˙, u, p, µ, λ) dt (3.21)
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Using Definition 3, we can rewrite (3.21) as (we subsequently drop the arguments of L and
other functions for brevity)∫ tf
t0
δL dt =
∫ tf
t0
{
∂L
∂x
δx+
∂L
∂x˙
δx˙+
∂L
∂u
δu+
∂L
∂p
δp+
∂L
∂µ
δµ+
∂L
∂λ
δλ
}
dt (3.22)
Rewriting the second term in the above eqn. using integration by parts, we get∫ tf
t0
∂L
∂x˙
δx˙ dt =
∂L
∂x˙
δx
∣∣∣tf
t0
−
∫ tf
t0
d
dt
(
∂L
δx˙
)
δx dt (3.23)
Substituting the above expression in (3.22), we have∫ tf
t0
δL dt =
∫ tf
t0
{(
∂L
∂x
− d
dt
(
∂L
∂x˙
))
δx+
∂L
∂u
δu+
∂L
∂p
δp+
∂L
∂µ
δµ+
∂L
∂λ
δλ
}
dt+
∂L
∂x˙
δx
∣∣∣tf
t0
(3.24)
Using the definition of L and g, we expand the above eqn. to get,∫ tf
t0
δL dt =
∫ tf
t0
[{(


∂
∂x
[
∂φ
∂t
+
∂φ
∂x
x˙
]
+
∂L
∂x
+ pT
∂f
∂x
+ µT
∂g
∂x
)
− d
dt
(


∂
∂x˙
[
∂φ
∂t
+
∂φ
∂x
x˙
]
− p
)}
δx+
{
∂L
∂u
+ pT
∂f
∂u
+ µT
∂g
∂u
}
δu
+
{
f − x˙
}
δp+
{
g + λ2
}
δµ+
{
2µTλ
}
δλ
]
dt+
∂L
∂x˙
δx
∣∣∣tf
t0
(3.25)
The two terms above canceled because simplification of the first term gives
∂
∂x
[
∂φ
∂t
+
∂φ
∂x
x˙
]
=
∂2φ
∂x∂t
+
∂2φ
∂x2
while simplification of the second term gives
d
dt
(
∂
∂x˙
[
∂φ
∂t
+
∂φ
∂x
x˙
])
=
d
dt
(
∂φ
∂x
)[
∵ ∂
∂x˙
(
∂φ
∂t
)
= 0
]
=
∂
∂x
(
∂φ
∂x
x˙
)
+
∂
∂t
(
∂φ
∂x
)
[using definition of total derivative]
=
∂2φ
∂x2
x˙+
∂2φ
∂t∂x
which are the same (using Clairaut’s theorem).
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Simplifying (3.25), we have∫ tf
t0
δL dt =
∫ tf
t0
[{(
∂L
∂x
+ pT
∂f
∂x
+ µT
∂g
∂x
)
+ p˙
}
δx
+
{
∂L
∂u
+ pT
∂f
∂u
+ µT
∂g
∂u
}
δu+
{
f − x˙
}
δp
+
{
g + λ2
}
δµ+
{
2µTλ
}
δλ
]
dt+
∂L
∂x˙
δx
∣∣∣tf
t0
(3.26)
Since (3.26) is the first variation in cost function Ja(u, p, µ, λ), the entire expression must evaluate
to zero.
While we will make use of the fact that the expression under the integral and the non-integral
expression are independently equal to zero, we do not prove it here (see [59] for some insight).
Thus, ∫ tf
t0
[{(
∂L
∂x
+ pT
∂f
∂x
+ µT
∂g
∂x
)
+ p˙
}
δx
+
{
∂L
∂u
+ pT
∂f
∂u
+ µT
∂g
∂u
}
δu+
{
f − x˙
}
δp
+
{
g + λ2
}
δµ+
{
2µTλ
}
δλ
]
dt = 0
(3.27)
and,
∂L
∂x˙
δx
∣∣∣tf
t0
=
(
∂φ
∂x
− p
)∣∣∣∣∣
tf
δx(tf ) = 0
[∵ x(tf ) is free but x(t0) is specified]
or,
(
∂φ
∂x
− p
)∣∣∣∣∣
tf
= 0
(3.28)
(3.28) is often referred to as transversality condition.
With reference to (3.27), the constraint
x˙ = f(t, x, u) (3.29)
must be satisfied by the optimal solution so that coefficient of δp is zero. The Lagrange
multipliers, p, are arbitrary, so let us select them in such a way to make the coefficient of δx
equal to zero, i.e.,
p˙ = −∂L
∂x
− pT ∂f
∂x
− µT ∂g
∂x
(3.30)
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The remaining variations δu, δµ, and δλ are independent, so, using fundamental lemma of
calculus of variations, their coefficients must be independently zero, thus
∂L
∂u
+ pT
∂f
∂u
+ µT
∂g
∂u
= 0 (3.31)
g + λ2 = 0 (3.32)
2µTλ = 0 (3.33)
Using (3.32), (3.33) it can be shown that
µT g = 0 (3.34)
Furthermore, while we are skipping the argument, it can be shown, using (3.30), that
µ(t) ≥ 0 (3.35)
Using (3.3) and (3.4), (3.30) can be rewritten as
p˙ = −∂L
∂x
(3.36)
Similarly, using (3.3) and (3.4), (3.31) can be rewritten as
∂L
∂u
= 0 (3.37)
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
3.2.4 Complete Set of Necessary Conditions for Optimality
In addition to the conditions derived above, few additional conditions are required for the pair
(x,u) to be optimal. We now present the complete set of necessary optimality conditions and
classify them as such:
Stationarity
∂L ∗
∂u
(t, x, u, p, µ) = 0 (N1)
p˙(t) = −∂L
∗
∂x
(t, x, u, p, µ)(
∂φ
∂x
− p
)∣∣∣∣∣
tf
= 0
(N2)
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Primal feasibility
x˙(t) =
∂L∗
∂p
(t, x, u, p, µ)
x(0) = x0
(N3)
g(t, x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0 (N4)
Dual feasibility
µ(t) ≥ 0 (N5)
Complementary slackness
µ(t)T g∗(t, x, u) = 0 (N6)
3.3 Linear Quadratic Regulator
Before we begin the study of nonlinear optimal control problems, we will derive important and
relevant results for a class of problems known as linear quadratic regulator (LQR). In this special
class of optimal control problems, the dynamics of the system are linear and the cost function
considered is quadratic in state and control variables. The (unconstrained) problem is thus to
find optimal control and state trajectories, u(t) and x(t), respectively, that minimize the cost
function
We now apply the necessary optimality conditions derived above to the case where the cost
function is quadratic, the dynamics are linear, and there are no additional constraints on the
system (like the inequality constraints). The goal of the problem is to regulate the dynamic
system.
We show that in the case of LQR, the necessary conditions are reduced to a differential
Riccati equation (DRE) and the resulting controller is a unique gain multiplied by the solution
of DRE. The problem is formally stated as:
min
u
J(u) =
1
2
∫ tf
t0
(
(x(t)TQx(t) + u(t)TRu(t)
)
dt (3.38)
subject to the dynamic constraint,
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), t ∈ [t0, tf ]
x(0) = x0
(3.39)
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where,
Q is a positive semi-definite state weighting matrix,
R is a positive definite control weighting matrix,
N is a cross-coupling matrix between state and control,
A is a system matrix, and
B is a control input matrix.
In this case, the Hamiltonian is given by
H =
1
2
(xTQx+ uTRu+ 2xTNu) + pT (Ax+Bu) (3.40)
Because there are no inequality constraints, L and H are the same here (see (3.3), (3.4)).
Applying the necessary conditions of optimality, we have
x˙ = ∇pH = Ax+Bu (3.41)
p˙ = −∇xH = −(Qx+Nu+AT p) (3.42)
0 = ∇uH = Ru+BTx+BT p (3.43)
Applying the transversality conditions to our problem with fixed final time (i.e. δtf = 0)
and free end state (δxf 6= 0), we get
p(tf ) = 0 (3.44)
(since ϕ = 0 in our case as there is no end point cost).
As we can see, (3.41) returns the original state dynamics and is therefore known as state
dynamics equation. Similarly, (3.42) is known as co-state equation and (3.43) is known as optimal
control equation. It is important to note that while (3.41) and (3.42) are differential equations,
(3.43) is an algebraic equation. Also important to note is that while the state dynamics equation
marches forward in time (due to boundary condition, x(0) = x0), the co-state equation marches
backward in time (due to boundary condition, p(tf ) = 0). As such, the two differential equations
constitute a two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP) as opposed an initial value problem
(IVP) which is simpler to solve.
Solving for the optimal control input, u(t), using (3.43), we get
u = −R−1(NTx+BT p) (3.45)
However, as it is, u(t) is a function of both the state vector, x and co-state vector, p and we
would like to find an expression for u(t) in terms of x alone. Therefore, we guess the following
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relationship between x and p. Let
p(t) = P (t)x(t) (3.46)
where P is some square matrix of size nxn. Since p(tf ) = 0, we set P (tf ) = 0 at the end time
so the equality is satisfied. Differentiating (3.46) with respect to time, we get
p˙ = P˙ x+ Px˙
= P˙ x+ P (Ax+Bu) (using (3.41))
= P˙ x+ P (Ax−BR−1(NTx+BT p)) (using (3.43))
= (P˙ + PA− PBR−1NT − PBR−1BTP )x (using (3.46)) (3.47)
Now, substituting (3.45) in (3.43) and setting it equal to LHS of (3.47), we get
− (Qx−NR−1(NTx+BT p) +AT p) = (P˙ + PA− PBR−1NT − PBR−1BTP )x
=⇒ −(Q−NR−1NT −NR−1BTP +ATP )x = (P˙ + PA− PBR−1NT − PBR−1BTP )x
=⇒ (P˙ + PA− PBR−1NT − PBR−1BTP +Q−NR−1NT −NR−1BTP +ATP )x = 0
(3.48)
Since x is arbitrary in (3.48), it must be the case that its coefficient is zero. We therefore have
the following equality:
P˙ + PA− PBR−1NT − PBR−1BTP +Q−NR−1NT −NR−1BTP +ATP = 0 (3.49)
which is known as the differential riccati equation (DRE).
We know have an optimal controller, u(t), that is a solution to out problem of optimal
control. Substituting (3.46) in (3.45), we get a linear fullstate feedback controller
u(t) = −R−1(NT +BTP (t))x(t) (3.50)
or,
u(t) = −K(t)x(t) (3.51)
where K(t) = R−1(NT + BTP (t)) and P(t) is the solution to the DRE given by (3.48)
subject to P (tf ) = 0.
While the necessary conditions of optimality are very useful in finding optimal solutions,
most of the nonlinear optimal control problems do not admit such analytical solutions. As a
result, in the next chapter, we present two very useful and important numerical schemes to
compute the solution to such problems.
Chapter 4
Numerical Methods in Optimal
Control
In this chapter, we present two numerical methods for solving constrained nonlinear optimal
control problems. These methods are then implemented on three example cases.
4.1 Introduction
Let us recall the nonlinear optimal control problem that we are trying to solve:
min
u
J(u) = φ(tf , xf ) +
∫ tf
t0
L(t, x(t), u(t)) dt
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
g(t, x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0
x(0) = xstart
x(tf ) = xfree
(4.1)
Before we present the two numerical schemes, we take a brief look at some of the methods
that are available to us, as well their shortcomings.
23
24
4.2 Methods of Optimal Control
In the previous chapter, we derived an analytical solution to the OCP when the cost function
is quadratic and the state dynamics are linear. However, generally speaking, these problems
are seldom linear and no analytical expressions exist for optimal controller. Such (nonlinear)
problems can be solved using three distinct methods which are:
1. Dynamic programming: This method requires solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation in the entire state space. Typically, the problems are solved within the mathematical
framework of Markov decision processes. This method works well for low dimensional problems
and generally provides globally optimal solution. However, it does not scale well for higher
dimensional systems because it involves discretization of the state space.
2. Indirect method: This method involves solving problems within the mathematical frame-
work of calculus of variations. The problem is solved using Euler-Lagrange equation along with
transversality condition to account for boundary conditions. The optimal control itself is found
using Pontryagin’s minimum principle. The resulting set of equations lead to TPBVP and is
then solved numerically. This method is only suitable for simple problems where the control
trajectories are smooth and continuous. The solutions resulting from this method usually tend
to be numerically unstable. Also, good initial co-state (or, adjoint variable) estimates are re-
quired to initialize the problem.
3. Direct method: This method discretizes the original continuous time optimal control
problem into a finite dimensional nonlinear programming problem. It then solves it using a
nonlinear programming solver such as sequential quadratic programming (SQP), interior-point
method, etc. This method is also known as the direct transcription method because it directly
transcribes the OCP into an NLP. Due to its better applicability in both high and low dimen-
sional systems, as well as low overhead for implementation, this method is going to be the focus
of our work.
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4.3 Direct Method
As mentioned earlier, the direct method discretizes an infinite dimensional function optimization
problem and converts it into a finite dimensional parameter optimization problem. This step
is also known as transcription. The resulting optimization problem is an NLP and is typically
solved using optimization solvers such as SQP. Transcription methods generally fall into two
categories, namely, shooting methods and collocation methods. The major difference is based
on how each method enforces the dynamic constraint. While shooting methods use simulation to
explicitly enforce the dynamic constraint, collocation methods enforce the dynamics on a series
of points (known as collocation points) along the trajectory. While shooting methods may be
easier to implement, they quickly become inadequate when dealing with complicated problems,
such as highly nonlinear constraints, etc. Therefore, in this work, we will focus exclusively on
collocation methods.
Collocation methods
Collocation methods directly represent state and control trajectory using decision variables, and
enforce the constraints (dynamic or static) only at certain specific points along the trajectory.
These specific points are what are known as collocation points. Five main steps are involved in
order to convert a continuous time optimal control problem into a discrete NLP (transcription),
and another two steps are involved once an NLP has been formulated (nonlinear programming).
These seven steps are listed as under:
4.3.1 Transcription
1. Choose time grid size and type
The grid type is either chosen to be uniform or non-uniform. Each of the two types have their
advantages and disadvantages. For example, while uniform grid is easy and straightforward to
implement, it leads to Runge’s phenomenon, which is a problem of oscillation at the edges of
the (time) interval when using polynomial interpolation. On the other hand, while non-uniform
grid can easily overcome Runge’s phenomenon, there are many ways to implement it and care
must be taken to ensure that function approximation respects the non-uniform nature of grid.
2. Discretize state and control vectors
Once a grid has been chosen, the state and the control trajectories can be discretized on the
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same grid. The specific discretization procedure depends on the type of method chosen.
3. Discretize cost function
Discretizing cost function involves approximating the integral cost function (such as Riemann
sum approximation). However, this step too depends on the particular transcription method
chosen.
4. Discretize and enforce dynamic constraint
Dynamic constraint typically refers to the differential equation that the system needs to satisfy
at every node of the grid. Again, this step depends on the chosen transcription method.
5. Discretize and enforce static constraints
Discretizing static constraint is straightforward and one only needs to ensure that the constraint
is enforced at every node of the chosen grid.
4.3.2 Nonlinear Programming
6. Solve the NLP
Steps 1-5 listed above were part of the transcription process which converts an infinite dimen-
sional functional optimization problem to a finite dimensional parameter optimization problem.
Following transcription, we now have an NLP which can be solved using a number of solvers
such as SQP, interior-point method, etc.
7. Interpolate the solution
Solving the NLP results in optimal state and control vectors at the chosen grid points. Depend-
ing on the choice of collocation method, this NLP solution is interpolated to generate smooth
trajectories between the nodes.
Collocation methods are a family of methods that can use either local or global function ap-
proximation, uniform or non-uniform grids, or can have several other distinguishing features, de-
pending upon the choices made in the steps 1-7 mentioned above. In the context of present work,
two methods will be implemented, namely trapezoidal collocation method and pseudospectral
collocation method. While the former is an easy to implement and easy to understand method,
it is less accurate and requires far more (typically uniform) grid points than the latter method,
which while not intuitive, is far more accurate and requires much less (non-uniform) grid points.
While there is no sharp distinction among collocation methods, one way in which they
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can be divided is orthogonal and non-orthogonal methods. In orthogonal collocation method,
orthogonal polynomials are used to approximate state and control trajectories. Orthogonal
polynomials have very appealing numerical properties which makes it is easy to use them for
performing integration, differentiation and interpolation procedures, procedures which as we
have seen in steps 1-7 above, are essential for solution of optimal control problem.
On the other hand, classical methods such as trapezoidal and Hermite-Simpson, are non-
orthogonal collocation methods as they use non-orthogonal polynomials for state and control
trajectory approximation. All Runge-Kutta schemes typically belong to non-orthogonal col-
location methods. For example, constant approximation between grid points leads to Euler’s
method, linear approximation between grid points leads to trapezoidal method, etc. More ad-
vanced methods such as those based on higher order
The two methods that we will present in this work, namely trapezoidal collocation and pseu-
dospectral collocation, are non-orthogonal and orthogonal methods, respectively. It is important
to note that while non-uniform grid can be chosen for the trapezoidal method, it is relatively
more tedious than its uniform grid based cousin, which is something we want to avoid given
trapezoidal rule is only second order accurate anyway. If not for the slow convergence of trape-
zoidal method, compared to the much faster pseudospectral method, trapezoidal method does
quite well on problems which are generally considered difficult.
We now describe the two methods in detail and present a framework for solving optimal
control problems using them.
4.4 Trapezoidal Collocation Method
This is a local method and so the discretization of optimal control problem described above
involves local approximation between the grid points. In this method, the control trajectory is
approximated as a linear spline between grid points and the state trajectory is approximated as
a quadratic spline. We now describe in detail the steps involved in implementing the Trapezoidal
method for solving optimal control problems [60].
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1. Grid type
We will use a uniform grid type for this method which means
t→ t0, ..., tk, ..., tN
where N is the number of segments and N + 1 is the number of nodes in the grid (or, grid
points). These grid points become what are known as collocation points.
2. Discretized state and control vectors
Depending on the chosen collocation points, the state and control trajectories are discretized at
those points. The discretized trajectories now become decision variables in the optimal control
problem.
u→ u0, ..., uk, ..., uN
x→ x0, ..., xk, ..., xN
where uk is a discrete representation of the control trajectory at the k
th collocation point.
Likewise, xk is a discrete representation of the state trajectory at the k
th collocation point. In
other words, xk = x(tk) and uk = u(tk). uk and xk are now finite dimensional vectors of size
nx and nu, respectively.
3. Integral approximation for cost function
The cost function is approximated using trapezoidal rule to give:
J = φ(tf , xf ) +
∫ tf
t0
L(t, x(t), u(t)) dt ≈ φ(tk, xk) +
N−1∑
k=0
1
2
hk(Lk + Lk+1) (4.2)
where hk = tk+1− tk = h = constant (because we chose a uniform grid), and Lk = L(tk, xk, uk).
4. Enforcing system dynamics as dynamic constraint
In trapezoidal method, the system dynamics are enforced at each collocation point by integrating
the dynamics and approximating the resulting integral using trapezoidal rule as mentioned in
the previous step. We therefore have:
x˙ = f∫ tk+1
tk
x˙ dt =
∫ tk+1
tk
f dt
xk+1 − xk ≈ 1
2
h(fk+1 + fk)
The last equation leads us the constraint which is applied between every pair of collocation
points k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}
xk+1 = xk +
1
2
h(fk+1 + fk) (4.3)
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5. Enforce static constraints
The static constraints are simply enforced at all collocation points such that
g(t, x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0 → g(tk, xk, uk) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N} (4.4)
6. Resulting NLP
Following steps 1-5, we now have the following NLP:
min
u0,...,uN
x0,...xN
J = φ(tk, xk) +
N−1∑
k=0
1
2
hk(Lk + Lk+1)
s.t. xk+1 = xk +
1
2
h(fk+1 + fk), ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}
g(tk, xk, uk) ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N}
x0 = xstart
xN = xfree
(4.5)
This NLP is then solved using SQP solver.
7. Solution interpolation
Because trapezoidal collocation works by approximating control trajectory as varying linearly
between the grid points, it is constructed as
u(t) ≈ uk + τ
h
(uk+1 − uk) for every interval, t ∈ [tk, tk+1] (4.6)
where τ = t− tk.
Next, because the dynamics too are approximated as varying linearly between the grid points,
this means that the state approximation, which is an integral of the dynamics, is approximated
via quadratic splines. This leads to the following construction of the state trajectory
x(t) ≈ xk + fkτ + τ
2
2h
(fk+1 − fk) for every interval, t ∈ [tk, tk+1] (4.7)
where τ = t− tk.
4.5 Pseudospectral Collocation Method
Pseudospectral methods are state-of-the-art collocation methods for solving optimal control
problems. Unlike, trapezoidal method which used uniform grid and local polynomials for ap-
proximating states and controls , this method uses non-uniform grid and global polynomials
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for approximating state and control trajectories. Using these methods, the state and control
trajectories are approximated as weighted sum of smooth basis functions, such as Legendre or
Chebyshev polynomials in the interval [−1, 1]. One of the major advantages of this method over
classical optimal control methods (such as the trapezoidal method) is the exponential conver-
gence rate of the solution which is faster than any polynomial rate (typical in case of classical
methods). Another advantage of this method is its use of relatively small number of grid points
to yield solutions high accuracy [38,61,62].
Before we provide the sequence of steps needed to implement this method, we take a quick
detour to talk about orthogonal polynomials and types of collocation points, two concepts which
lie at the heart of pseudospectral methods.
4.5.1 Orthogonal Polynomials
Orthogonal polynomials Pn(τ) are a class of polynomials defined over an interval [t0, tf ] such
that they obey the following orthogonality condition:
∫ tf
t0
w(τ)Pm(τ)Pn(τ)dτ =
1, if m = n0, if m 6= n (4.8)
where w(τ) is a weighting function.
In our method, we will use Legendre polynomials as the choice for orthogonal polynomials.
Other polynomials such as Chebyshev polynomials can also be used, which result in a variant of
pseudospectral optimal control method. The Legendre polynomials Pn(τ) are the eigenfunctions
of a singular Sturm-Lioville problem:
(1− τ2)d
2Pn(τ)
dτ2
− 2τ dPn(τ)
dτ
+ n(n+ 1)Pn(τ) = 0 (4.9)
where n(n + 1) = λ is generally called eigenvalue of the problem. The differential equation is
solved for particular values of λ to yield the eigenfunctions Pn(τ). The Legendre polynomials
are orthogonal over the interval [−1, 1] with weight function w = 1. A Legendre polynomial of
order N can be generated from:
PN (τ) =
1
2NN !
dN
dτN
(τ2 − 1)N (4.10)
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4.5.2 Collocation Points
One can also get variants of pseudospectral methods depending on how the collocation points
are chosen. If none of the end points of the interval [−1, 1] are included as collocation points,
we get Legendre-Gauss (LG) points. If one of the end points of the interval is included as a
collocation point, we get Legendre-Gauss-Radau (LGR) points. If both the end points of the
interval are included as collocation points, we get Legendre-Gauss-Lobatto (LGL) points [63].
In this work, LGL points (or nodes) will be used. These nodes are the roots of P˙N (τ) together
with −1 and 1. For example, if N = 3, the collocation points τk(k = 0, ..., N) are
[τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3] = [−1,−0.4472, 0.4472, 1]
where τ1, τ2 are the roots of the Legendre polynomial P˙3(τ).
4.5.3 Lagrange Polynomials
In the case of pseudospectral methods, Lagrange polynomials are used to approximate state
and control trajectories via global polynomials. Given a set of N + 1 distinct collocation points
τ0, ..., τN and the value of a function at those points , i.e., f(τ0), ..., f(τN ), a unique polynomial
P (τ) of degree at most N exists such that
P (τk) = f(τk), ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N}
This polynomial is defined as
P (τ) =
N∑
k=0
f(τk)Lk(τ)
where
Lk(τ) =
N∏
i=0,i6=k
τ − τi
τk − τi (4.11)
Here P (τ) is known as the Lagrange polynomial and Lk(τ) are called Lagrange basis polynomials.
We now describe the steps involved in implementing Legendre pseudospectral optimal control
method.
1. Grid type
A non-uniform grid is chosen for collocation. Because Legendre polynomials are orthonormal
in the interval [−1, 1], the independent variable t ∈ [t0, tf ] is mapped to a new independent
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variable τ ∈ [−1, 1] via the following affine transformation:
τ ← 2
tf − t0 t−
tf + t0
tf − t0 (4.12)
Because of this transformation, the original OCP is transformed to the following new OCP:
min
u
J(u) = φ(tf , x(1)) +
tf − t0
2
∫ 1
−1
L(τ, x(τ), u(τ)) dτ
s.t. x˙(τ) =
tf − t0
2
f(τ, x(τ), u(τ)), τ ∈ [−1, 1]
g(τ, x(τ), u(τ)) ≤ 0, τ ∈ [−1, 1]
x(−1) = xstart
x(1) = xfree
(4.13)
The collocation points τk associated with the non-uniform grid were described in the previous
subsection.
2. Discretized state and control vectors
Based on the collocation points, the state and control trajectories are defined as:
u→ u(τ0), ..., u(τk), ..., u(τN )
x→ x(τ0), ..., x(τk), ..., x(τN )
We now use Lagrange polynomials to approximate state trajectories as:
x(τ) ≈ xN (τ) =
N∑
k=0
x(τk)Lk(τ) (4.14)
Similarly, we approximate control trajectories as:
u(τ) ≈ uN (τ) =
N∑
k=0
u(τk)Lk(τ) (4.15)
where xN (τ), uN (τ) are Lagrange polynomials of degree N and Lk(τ) are the Lagrange basis
functions as defined by (4.11).
3. Integral approximation for cost function
The cost function is approximated using Gaussian quadrature. Note that if the integrand is
a polynomial of degree ≤ 2N − 1, the integral can be computed exactly over then interval
τ ∈ [−1, 1].
J(u) = φ(tf , x(1)) +
tf − t0
2
∫ 1
−1
L(τ, x(τ), u(τ)) dτ
≈ φ(tf , x(1)) + tf − t0
2
N∑
k=0
L(τk, x(τk), u(τk))wk
(4.16)
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wk =
2
N(N + 1)
1
PN (τk)2
(4.17)
where wk are the quadrature weights associated with the integral approximation and PN is the
Legendre polynomial of degree N .
4. Enforcing system dynamics as dynamic constraint
Taking the derivative of (4.14), we get
x˙(τ) ≈ x˙N (τ) =
N∑
k=0
x(τk)L˙k(τ) (4.18)
This can be written as
x˙(τk) ≈ x˙N (τk) =
N∑
i=0
Dkix
N (τi) (4.19)
where Dki is an (N + 1)x(N + 1) differentiation matrix given by
Dki =

−PN (τk)PN (τi) 1τk−τi , if k 6= i
N(N+1)
4 , if k = i = 0
−N(N+1)4 , if k = i = N
0, otherwise
(4.20)
The constraint enforced at each collocation point k ∈ {0, ...N} is therefore
xN (τk) =
N∑
i=0
Dkix
N (τi) =
tf − t0
2
f(τk, x(τk), u(τk)) (4.21)
5. Enforce static constraints
The static constraints are simply enforced at all collocation points such that
g(τ, x(τ), u(τ)) ≤ 0 → g(τk, x(τk), u(τk)) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N} (4.22)
6. Resulting NLP
Following the transcription steps 1-5, we end up with the following NLP:
min
u0,...,uN
x0,...xN
J = φ(tf , x(1)) +
tf − t0
2
N∑
k=0
L(τk, x(τk), u(τk))wk
s.t.
N∑
i=0
Dkix
N (τi) =
tf − t0
2
f(τk, x(τk), u(τk)), ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N}
g(tk, xk, uk) ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ {0, ..., N}
x(−1) = xstart
x(1) = xfree
(4.23)
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This NLP is now solved using SQP.
7. Solution interpolation
The interpolation of the state and control vectors is done using Lagrange polynomials using
(4.14)-(4.15), respectively.
4.6 Simulations
We now present three nonlinear optimal control problems of increasing difficulty. These prob-
lems will be used again in the next chapter to demonstrate the application of inverse optimal
control.
1) Kinematic unicycle
A kinematic unicycle
As our first example, we consider a kinematic unicycle. It is subjected
to the following optimal control problem:
min
u
J =
∫ 2
0
(9x21 + 2x
2
2 + 5x
2
3 + u
2) dt
s.t. x˙ =

cos(x3)
sin(x3)
u

x =

x1, x position
x2, y position
x3, heading
 u = [angular velocity]
u+
x1
6
≤ 0
x(0) =

1
2
0

x(2) = xfree
(4.24)
Here, x ∈ R3 is the state vector of the system and u ∈ R is the control input to the system.
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2) Cart-pole problem
A cart-pole balancer
As our second example case, we present a dynamic system in the
form of a cart-pole balancer. Here, a pendulum is attached to a
cart and has to be balanced by applying a force as an input to the
cart. The optimal control problem in this case is presented as:
min
u
J =
∫ 2
0
(xTQx+ uTRu) dt
s.t. x˙ =

x˙1
x˙2
x¨1
x¨2

x =

x1, cart linear position
x2, cart linear velocity
x3, pole angular position
x4, pole angular velocity
 u =
[
force
]
−0.2 ≤ u ≤ 0.2
x(0) =

1
0.2
0
0
 x(tf ) = free
(4.25)
x¨1 =
1
mc +mp sin
2(x2)
[u+mp sin(x2)(lx˙
2
2 + g cos(x2))]
x¨2 =
1
l(mc +mp sin
2(x2))
[−u cos(x2)−mplx˙22 cos(x2)− (mc +mp)g sin(x2)]
Q =

0.5 0 0 0
0 9 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 6
 R = 3
Here, x ∈ R4 are the states of the system and u ∈ R is the control input to the system and the
Q,R are the weighting matrices associated with state and control trajectories, respectively.
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3) Elbow manipulator
An elbow manipulator
As our final example, we present a 3 dof robot manipulator com-
monly known as an elbow manipulator. The dynamics of the robot
is described in robot joint space, although a task space description
is also straightforward, using manipulator jacobian. It is actuated
by three motors at each of the three joints. The optimal control
problem corresponding to the robot is:
min
u
J =
∫ 3
0
(xTQx+ uTRu) dt
s.t. M(θ)θ¨ + C(θ, θ˙)θ˙ +G(θ) = κu
x =
x1−3 = θ1−3, joint angles1−3
x4−6 = θ˙1−3, joint velocities1−3

u =
[
u1−3, joint torques1−3
]
x(0) =

pi
6
pi
8
pi
14
0
0
0

x(tf ) = free
(4.26)
Q =

2.5 0 0 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

R =

1 0 0
0 3 0
0 0 2

Here, x ∈ R6 is the state vector of the system and u ∈ R3 is the control input to the system. κ
is a scaling factor which is used to ensure the numerical stability of the inverse optimal control
problem, to be discussed in the next chapter.
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4.7 Results and Discussion
Note: All the example problems presented here are solved using MATLAB’s fmincon function
with SQP solver.
The kinematic unicycle problem as well as the cart-pole problem were solved using trapezoidal
transcription method on a grid of 50 and 100 points, respectively. The elbow manipulator prob-
lem was solved using pseudospectral method on a grid of 30 nodes. While the unicycle and
cart-pole problems have mixed inequality constraint and control saturation constraint, respec-
tively, the elbow manipulator problem was solved without any such constraints. This was done
so as to show that the methodology used in solving the first two constrained problems can also
be used to solve an unconstrained problem. Because all three example problems are regulation
problems, we can see from the plots that both state and control trajectories are trying to reg-
ulate to zero value. Also, because both unicycle and cart-pole problems are subject to control
constraints, we can see from their respective control plots that the control actions get saturated.
As a result, we see non-smooth control trajectories. Elbow manipulator problem, on the other
hand, admits smooth control trajectories due to absence of any constraints.
A few additional comments are in order with respect to elbow manipulator problem. Firstly,
only the joint angle plots are shown in Figure 4.3 a. This is done so as to avoid clutter in the
plot but the joint velocity trajectories do behave expectedly. Secondly, a scaling parameter,
κ, is used so as to make the corresponding inverse optimal control problem (which is to be
discussed in the next chapter) numerically stable. The use, or lack thereof, of κ, does not affect
the numerical stability of the current (forward) optimal control problem. Lastly, no scaling
parameter is needed for the inverse problem if gravity compensation is done.
Finally, as a check to validate the accuracy of optimal control solutions, we can see that the
constraints in both unicycle and cart-pole are satisfied throughout the trajectories.
As mentioned previously, the state and control trajectory data for each of the three problems
will serve as the input to the inverse optimal control method to be presented in the next chapter.
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c. Constraint
Figure 4.1: This figure plots state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for unicycle model. As can
be seen, the constraints (c.) are satisfied throughout the trajectory.
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Figure 4.2: This figure plots state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for cart-pole model. As can
be seen, the constraints (c.) are satisfied throughout the trajectory.
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Figure 4.3: This figure plots state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for elbow manipulator
model. This problem does not have any mixed and/or control constraints.
Chapter 5
Inverse Optimal Control
The problem of optimal control is to find a controller which is optimal with respect to perfor-
mance metric. Commonly, this metric is known as the cost function and the controller tries to
minimize this cost function to yield a set of optimal control inputs. Usually, the cost function is
an integral cost function and is minimized along the trajectory of the system from some initial
state to some final state of the system.
Inverse optimal control (IOC) is the (inverse) problem of trying to find the underlying cost
function with respect to which the state and control trajectories are (locally) optimal. In this
chapter, we extend the method of Johnson et al. [18] to impute cost functions when the systems
involve state and/or control constraints.
5.1 Constrained Inverse Optimal Control
In the case of unconstrained IOC problem with only Lagrange cost, Johnson et al. were able
to setup the inverse problem as an LQR. However, when we incorporate mixed inequality con-
straints (i.e., constraints containing both state and control vectors) and/or control constraints,
the LQR structure of the problem no longer exists.
5.1.1 Problem Statement
We now present a generalization of the inverse problem in the light of mixed inequality con-
straints in the Bolza form.
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We now consider optimal control problems of the form
minimize
u
∫ tf
t0
cTφ(t, x(t), u(t)) dt
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
g(t, x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0
x(0) = xstart
x(tf ) = free
(5.1)
Notation:
x(t) ∈ Rnx is the state vector.
u(t) ∈ Rnu is the control vector.
f(t, x(t), u(t)) : R× Rnx × Rnu → Rnx is the system dynamics.
φ(t, x(t), u(t)) : R× Rnx × Rnu → Rk is known feature vector; k is the length of feature vector.
c ∈ Rk is weight vector.
g(t, x(t), u(t)) : R × Rnx × Rnu → Rs is path inequality constraint; s is the size of constraint
vector.
cTφ(t, x(t), u(t)) is the scalar cost function
∇zq is gradient of function q with respect to variable z.
We now make following assumptions on the optimal control problem for it to be well posed
and amenable to the analysis of this work.
1) f [x(t), u(t)] is assumed to be continuous in time and differentiable in state and control vari-
ables.
2) ∇xf [x(t), u(t)] is continuous in both time and control variables.
3) The control variable is at least piecewise continuous in time.
4) The feature or basis vector φ[x(t), u(t)] is differentiable in both state and control variables.
5) The functions that appear in equation (7) are not explicit function of time
6) The inequality path constraint, g[t, x(t), u(t)] is continuous in time, state and control variables
and differentiable in state and control variables.
To discuss the problem of optimal control under mixed inequality constraints, we first define
the Hamiltonian, H and the Lagrangian, L as follows (for brevity, we will, at times, omit the
time dependence of variables in the equations to follow):
H (t, x, u, p) = cTφ(t, x, u) + pT f(t, x, u) (5.2)
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L (t, x, u, p, µ) =H (t, x, u, p) + µT g(t, x, u) (5.3)
where p ∈ Rnx is the adjoint variable and µ ∈ Rk is the Lagrange multiplier. We also define the
state-dependent control region as
Λ(t, x) = {u ∈ Rnu |g[t, x, u] ≤ 0} ⊂ Rnu (5.4)
We are now in a position to state a formulation of Pontryagin’s minimum principle that is used
when dealing with optimal control problems with mixed inequality constraints. The results are
based on the necessary conditions of optimality derived in Chapter 3 and are presented here
again for convenience:
u∗(t) = argmin
u∈Λ(t,x∗)
H(t, x∗(t), u, p(t))
∇uL∗(t, x, u, p(t), µ(t)) = 0
p˙(t) = −∇xL∗(t, x, u, p(t), µ(t))
p(tf ) = 0
µ(t) ≥ 0
µ(t)T g∗(t, x, u) = 0
(5.5)
Applying the aforementioned necessary conditions to our problem of optimal control, we
have
−p˙(t) = cT∇xφ(t, x, u) + pT∇xf(t, x, u) + µT∇xg(t, x, u)
p(tf ) = 0
(5.6)
0 = cT∇uφ(t, x, u) + pT∇uf(t, x, u) + µT∇ug(t, x, u) (5.7)
Assuming similar naming convention as [18], we let
p˙(t) = v(t) (5.8)
z(t) =

c
p(t)
µ(t)
 (5.9)
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The residual function r[c, p(t), v(t), µ(t)] is then defined by assuming slack in the necessary
conditions of optimality as
r[z(t), v(t)] =
∇xφ
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇xf
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇xg
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇uφ
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇uf
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇ug
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
 z(t) +
I
0
 v(t) (5.10)
5.1.2 Residual Function Optimization
We now state the optimization problem which is a result of constrained inverse optimal control.
The solution to this residual optimization problem recovers the underlying weight vector.
minimize
z(t),v(t)
∫ tf
t0
||r[z(t), v(t)]||2 dt
s.t. p˙(t) = v(t)
p(tf ) = 0
µ(t) ≥ 0
µ(t)T g(x(t), u(t)) = 0
(5.11)
where the last two conditions are also known as complementary slackness which appear here
due to mixed inequality constraint present in forward optimal control.
Note that this is a convex optimization problem with input v(t) and state z(t). Thus, it
is amenable to efficient numerical solution via transcription methods such as those described
in [31].
5.1.3 Improving Accuracy of IOC
When learning a cost function from observations, the performance of the IOC method improves
as the number of trajectories or observations is increased. Consider k trajectories which may
begin from different initial conditions, but run for the same length of time tf . We label these
k state and control trajectories as (x(j), u(j)) ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k}. In this case, the IOC variables of
interest, v(t), z(t), and r(z(t), v(t)) are extended to include the information from k trajectories
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so that:
v = p˙ =

p˙(1)
...
p˙(k)
 z =

c
p
µ
 =

c
p(1)
...
p(k)
µ(1)
...
µ(k)

To make the notation succinct, we make the following simplifications in reference to (5.10). Let
A =
∇xφ
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇uφ
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
 B =
∇xf
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇uf
∣∣∣T
(x,u)

C =
∇xg
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
∇ug
∣∣∣T
(x,u)
 I =
I
0

Using the above notation, we can rewrite (5.10) as
r(z(t), v(t)) =
[
A B C
]
z(t) +I v(t) (5.12)
Extending to k trajectories, we get
r(z(t), v(t)) =
A(1)
...
A(k)
B(1) 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 B(k)
C(1) 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 C(k)
 z(t) +

I (1) 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 I (k)
 v(t)
(5.13)
As a result of incorporating k observations, note that the resulting residual vector, r(z(t), v(t)),
has a lot of sparse structure. This structure is utilized when solving the residual minimization
problem (5.11).
Remarks
Following remarks are now in order:
1. Convex Optimization: Note that (5.11) is a convex optimal control problem with input v(t)
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and state z(t). Thus, it is amenable to efficient numerical solution via transcription methods
such as those described in [31].
2. Normalization: In the absence of any normalization procedure, (5.11) can be trivially solved
by z = 0. However, in many applications, we know some part of the cost function from domain
specific knowledge. Therefore, we can often choose one of the weights in weight vector c to be
equal to 1. More generally, we can impose the constraints that ci ≥ 0 and
∑k
i=1 ci = 1 (see [45]).
3. Sufficiency condition: The present work does not provide any sufficiency result to show that
the computed solution is indeed a minimum of the problem, the sufficiency condition is implicitly
assumed. This is a common assumption in the literature [18,59,60].
5.2 Simulations
This section presents the same three example problems from the previous chapter, but this time
they will be used to implement inverse optimal control method discussed in this chapter. A
description of the three examples is provided again for convenience.
1) Kinematic Unicycle
min
u
J =
∫ 2
0
(9x21 + 2x
2
2 + 5x
2
3 + u
2) dt
s.t. x˙ =

cos(x3)
sin(x3)
u

x =

x1, x position
x2, y position
x3, heading
 u = [angular velocity]
u+
x1
6
≤ 0
x(0) =

1
2
0

x(2) = xfree
(5.14)
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2) Cart-pole balancing
min
u
J =
∫ 2
0
(xTQx+ uTRu) dt
s.t. x˙ =

x˙1
x˙2
x¨1
x¨2

x =

x1, cart linear position
x2, cart linear velocity
x3, pole angular position
x4, pole angular velocity
 u =
[
force
]
−0.2 ≤ u ≤ 0.2
x(0) =

1
0.2
0
0

x(tf ) = free
(5.15)
where,
x¨1 =
1
mc +mp sin
2(x2)
[u+mp sin(x2)(lx˙
2
2 + g cos(x2))]
x¨2 =
1
l(mc +mp sin
2(x2))
[−u cos(x2)−mplx˙22 cos(x2)− (mc +mp)g sin(x2)]
Q =

0.5 0 0 0
0 9 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 6
 R = 3
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3) Elbow manipulator
min
u
J =
∫ 3
0
(xTQx+ uTRu) dt
s.t. M(θ)θ¨ + C(θ, θ˙)θ˙ +G(θ) = κu
x =
x1−3 = θ1−3, joint angles1−3
x4−6 = θ˙1−3, joint velocities1−3
 u = [u1−3, joint torques1−3]
x(0) =

pi
6
pi
8
pi
14
0
0
0

x(tf ) = free
(5.16)
Q =

2.5 0 0 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

R =

1 0 0
0 3 0
0 0 2

5.3 Results and Discussion
Note: All the example problems presented here are solved using MATLAB’s fmincon function
with SQP solver.
Figure 5.1 a,b. show the state and control trajectories for the kinematic unicycle. As we can
see, the predicted state and control trajectories virtually lie on top of the actual simulated
trajectories. As a check on the validity of the IOC method, we can also see that dual constraint
(c.) as well as complementary slackness condition (d.) are satisfied.
Figure 5.2 a,b. show the state and control trajectories for the cart-pole problem. Here again,
the predicted trajectories are in close agreement with the actual simulated trajectories. As a
check on the validity of the IOC method, we can also see that dual constraint (c.) as well as
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Table 5.1: Comparison of weight vector from forward and inverse optimal control
System
Feature vector
(φ)
Weight vector (from
forward method)
(c = ctrue)
Learned weight vector
(from inverse method)
(c = clearned)
Minimized residual
function (r)
Kinematic unicycle φ = [x21, x
2
2, x
2
3, u
2] [9, 2, 5, 1] [8.9867, 1.9733, 4.9898,1] 2.767× 0−04
Cart-pole balancing φ = [x21, x
2
2, x
2
3, x
2
4, u
2] [0.5, 9, 1, 6, 3] [0.5, 9.2268, 1, 5.9829, 2.9952] 3.258× 10−05
Elbow manipulator
φ = [x21, x
2
2, x
2
3, x
2
4, x
2
5,
x26, u
2
1, u
2
2, u
2
3]
[2.5, 4, 1.5, 0, 0.5
1, 1, 3, 2]
[2.4751, 3.9029, 1.4668, 0.0083, 0.4892
0.9724, 1, 2.9299, 1.9573]
5.070× 10−05
complementary slackness condition (d.) are satisfied. Another important thing to note is that
the box constraint in this problem is handled by breaking down the constraint into two separate
constraints g1, g2.
Finally, Figure 5.3 a,b. show the state and control trajectories for the robot problem. Like
in the previous two cases, the predicted trajectories are indistinguishable from the actual tra-
jectories. However, unlike the last two cases, this problem does not have state and/or control
constraints.
While Figures 5.1-5.3 provide visual description of the results, Table 5.1 provides a quanti-
tative measure of the performance of the inverse optimal control method. It compares the true
cost functions and the learned cost functions and also provides a value for the residual function.
The quality of the solution can be judged from its value of final residual function: the lower the
value of the residual, the better IOC method was able to recover the underlying cost function.
While the inverse optimal control method perform well in recovering the underlying cost
functions in all example cases, the feature errors can be further reduced by either sampling the
observations at a faster rate, or by observing more trajectories. In a real life scenario, if the
sensors recording the observational data cannot sample at a faster rate, simply more trajectories
can be observed. On the other hand, if recording data for several trajectories is cumbersome,
high resolution sensors can be used to sample more in a given time for a given trajectory.
Cost function, as mentioned in this work, has sometimes interchangeably been used with the
weight vector. However, it is important to note that they are distinct. A cost function is com-
posed of a weight vector and a feature vector. Feature vectors are generally domain dependent
and require knowledge of the expert to construct it from experience and sound judgment. Once
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a feature vector is passed to the inverse optimal control, the inverse methods then try to learn
the weight vector. The weight vector indicates the relative importance of the different features
present in the feature vector. In this paper, the weight vector is always assumed to be positive.
In reality, one will never have access to true cost function so that it can be compared against
learned cost function. The best one can do is to learn an underlying cost function which respects
the constraints and compare the predicted trajectories from that cost function with the actual
trajectories generated by the system of interest. Typically, the expert will have some knowledge
about the ways in which a given system is constrained. These constraints should be passed to
the inverse methods so that a correct cost function can be learned. If the expert fails to account
for the constraints that may be present in a system, it is very likely that the learned cost function
will perform poorly. Also, it is possible that if enough trajectories are not observed, the cost
function learned maybe incorrect. This is because the inverse methods may not have been able
to sample the feasible state/control space completely. Another point to note is that although
the feature vectors in the examples provided were chosen to be quadratic for reasons of physical
intuition, it is possible to choose the feature vectors to be non-quadratic, if the problem so
desires. The inverse methods will still be able to provide locally optimal solution to the residual
minimization problem in (5.11)
In the case of unicycle and cart-pole problem, we estimated the weight vector using two
trajectories, while in the case of elbow manipulator, we only used a single trajectory. For
unconstrained problems, a single trajectory is typically sufficient to learn the cost weights.
However, for constrained systems, a single trajectory often does not give sufficient information
to learn the cost. In particular, optimal solutions for problems with input constraints often
exhibit control saturation throughout the trajectory. A saturated control constraint implies
that the corresponding cost is sufficiently small to allow saturation, but the precise cost weight
cannot be obtained. We can improve the likelihood of observing unsaturated trajectories by
simply observing more trajectories.
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c. Dual feasibility d. Complementary slackness
Figure 5.1: This figure compares the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the unicycle
model computed using true (actual) and learned (predicted) cost functions. As can be seen,
the computed costs are sufficiently accurate to reproduce the original trajectories. We also see
that the dual feasibility constraint (c.) as well complementary slackness (d.) are satisfied. Here
constraint g = u+ x16 .
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c. Dual feasibility d. Complementary slackness
Figure 5.2: This figure compares the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the cart-pole
model computed using true (actual) and learned (predicted) cost functions. As can be seen,
the computed costs are sufficiently accurate to reproduce the original trajectories. We also see
that the dual feasibility constraint (c.) as well complementary slackness (d.) are satisfied. Here
constraints g1 = −u− 0.2 and g2 = u− 0.2, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: This figure compares the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the elbow
manipulator model computed using true (actual) and learned (predicted) cost functions. As can
be seen, the computed costs are sufficiently accurate to reproduce the original trajectories. This
problem does not have any mixed and/or control constraints.
Chapter 6
Dynamic Games
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives interact over time. They
can be thought of as an obvious extension to single objective optimization problems (such as
optimal control problems). Dynamic games are a natural framework for studying interactive
behaviors which are not fully cooperative, and not fully competitive. Such games are called
non-zero sum. Consider the case of vehicle driving. Drivers prioritize individual speed, safety,
and comfort. While drivers are largely indifferent to the behavior and costs of others, they will
cooperate to prevent collisions. Furthermore, different individuals have varying behaviors based
on their particular objectives. For example, some prioritize speed, while others prioritize safety.
In nature, non-zero sum behavior arises when animals are largely indifferent to one-another,
unless they need to compete for a resource.
In this chapter, we present a novel method for solving Nash equilibrium solution of a dynamic
game. We also present two example cases where the solution is computed using this method.
6.1 Problem Formulation of Dynamic Games
Consider an N player nonzero-sum open-loop dynamic game where every player i ∈ {1, ..., N}
has an associated performance index Ji. The dynamics associated with state of the game evolve
via a coupled nonlinear set of differential equations x˙ = f(t, x, u1, ..., uN ). The goal of each
player is to minimize their own performance index by an appropriate choice of control action
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ui. The actions of the other agents are denoted by u−i. The problem is stated formally as:
Ji(ui, u−i) = minimize
ui
∫ tf
t0
cTi φi(t, x(t), u1(t), ..., uN (t)) dt
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))
gi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)) ≤ 0
x(0) = xstart
x(tf ) = free
(6.1)
Because we are considering deterministic dynamics and open-loop trajectories, the performance
index, Ji(ui, u−i) can be viewed as function of the inputs. Before we proceed further, we provide
some useful definitions which will be relevant to the present work.
Definition (Zero-sum dynamic game): A dynamic game in which each player’s gains or
losses is exactly balanced by the gains or losses of other players. This leads to the overall gains
and losses to sum exactly to zero. This game is also called as strictly competitive.
In contrast with a zero-sum dynamic game, a nonzero-sum game can be seen as a less
restrictive game setting.
Definition (Nonzero-sum dynamic game): A dynamic game in which the overall gains
and losses can be less than or more than zero. In a nonzero-sum dynamic game, every player
tries to minimize its own performance index, by choosing an optimal ui. This setting can be
either competitive or cooperative or a mixture of both.
The optimality of the control input ui leads to the concept of an (open-loop) Nash equilib-
rium.
Definition (Nash equilibrium): A dynamic game involving N players is said to be in a
local open-loop Nash equilibrium if any admissible control action ui in a neighborhood of u
∗
i of
the ith player is such that
J(u∗i , u
∗
−i) ≤ J(ui, u∗−i). (6.2)
We will often refer to a solution satisfying (6.2) in a neighborhood simply as a Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, it is a Nash equilibrium of the game in a restricted neighborhood.
In the present work, we focus our attention to solving only nonzero-sum dynamic games.
Following similar development as in the case of optimal control, the Hamiltonian, H and
the Lagrangian, L associated with the ith player is
Hi(t, x, ui, u−i, pi) = cTi φi(t, x, ui, u−i) + p
T
i f(t, x, ui, u−i) (6.3)
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Li(t, x, ui, u−i, pi, µi) = Hi(t, x, ui, u−i, pi) + µTi gi(t, x, ui, u−i) (6.4)
At a Nash equilibrium, every player simultaneously minimizes its own performance index
subject to dynamics of the game and player constraints. Thus, every player i ∈ {1, ..., N}
satisfies the following set of necessary conditions:
Stationarity
∇uiL∗i (t, x, ui, u−i, pi(t), µi(t)) = 0 (P1)
p˙i(t) = −∇xL∗i (t, x, ui, u−i, pi(t), µi(t))
pi(tf ) = 0
(P2)
Primal feasibility
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)
x(0) = x0
(P3)
gi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)) ≤ 0 (P4)
Dual feasibility
µi(t) ≥ 0 (P5)
Complementary slackness
µi(t)
T g∗i (t, x, ui, u−i) = 0 (P6)
6.2 Semi-direct Method
We now present a solution strategy to deal with non-zero sum dynamic games. To our knowledge,
the method we present here is novel and is now described below.
6.2.1 Semi-Direct Method for Unconstrained Dynamic Games
Recall that (6.1) is subject to mixed inequality constraint gi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)) ≤ 0, for every
player i. Let us ignore this constraint so we can focus on the unconstrained problem. This
problem results in necessary conditions of optimality given by eqns. (P1)-(P3). As such, these
set of equations result in a two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP) and can be solved us-
ing solvers such as bvp4c provided by MATLAB. However, in this paper, we provide a solution
technique which we call semi-direct method. The method can be described as recasting the
TPBVP as an optimal control feasibility problem. Formally, the problem can be described as:
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minJ = 0
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))
x(0) = x0
p˙i(t) = −∇xL∗i (t, x, ui, u−i, pi(t), µi(t))
pi(tf ) = 0
∇uiL∗i (t, x, ui, u−i, pi(t), µi(t)) = 0
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
(6.5)
It is important to note that (6.5) is solved simultaneously for every player i.
We now see that the necessary conditions of optimality (P1)-(P3), comprising of a set of
differential equations, can be seen as the constraints in an optimal control problem.
6.2.2 Semi-Direct Method for Constrained Dynamic Games
The approach we developed for the unconstrained case has powerful consequences because it
can be easily extended to the constrained case. This generalization is not possible with TP-
BVP solvers. In the constrained case, we add the remaining necessary conditions of optimality
(P4)-(P6) (related to the constraints). The problem can again be posed as an optimal control
feasibility problem:
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minJ = 0
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))
x(0) = x0
p˙i(t) = −∇xL∗i (t, x, ui, u−i, pi(t), µi(t))
pi(tf ) = 0
∇uiL∗i (t, x, ui, u−i, pi(t), µi(t)) = 0
gi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)) ≤ 0
µi(t) ≥ 0
µi(t)
T gi(t, x, ui, u−i) = 0
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
(6.6)
As noted previously for the unconstrained dynamic game, (6.6) is solved simultaneously for
every player i.
Therefore, the cost of going from unconstrained case to a constrained is only addition of
extra constraints to the feasibility problem which could be solved using standard optimization
solvers.
We have thus shown that any dynamic game consisting of multiple players, with each player
optimizing their own performance index, as well as being subjected to game dynamics and con-
straints, can be reduced to a single (trivial, since J=0) objective optimization problem subject to
dynamic and path constraints.
Remarks about Semi-Direct Method
1. The reason we call our method semi-direct is due to the fact that we combine both, direct
and indirect methods used for solving optimal control problems, to solve the dynamic game
problem given by (6.1). This problem essentially reduces to a feasibility problem because there
is no objective function to optimize over. Any solution which lies in the feasible space of (6.6)
is an optimal solution to the original problem (6.1).
2. The present work does not provide any existence or uniqueness results for Nash equilibrium
solution, nor does it provide any sufficiency results to prove that the equilibrium is necessarily a
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minimum of the dynamic game. The work is only concerned with showing that if a Nash equilib-
rium exists, then the semi-direct method can be used to compute state and control trajectories
of the players that are in Nash equilibrium.
6.3 Simulations
In this section, we present two example cases of dynamic games to demonstrate and evaluate
the performance of the semi-direct method. The example cases include duopolistic competition
scenario and a nonlinear polynomial game, both problems were inspired from [26].
1) Duopolistic competition
As our first example case, we consider the following linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential
game:
min
u1
J1 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(x2 + 2u21) dt
min
u2
J2 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(4x2 + u22)
s.t. x˙ = x+ u1 + u2
x+ u1 + 5 ≤ 0
x(0) = x0
x(3) = xfree
(6.7)
Here, x ∈ R is the state vector of the game and u ∈ R2 is the control vector whose elements
consists of the control actions for Player 1 and Player 2.
2) Nonlinear polynomial game
As our second example, we consider a model for a nonlinear electric circuit managed by two
companies employing different cost metrics for the consumed electricity. The objective of the
game is to minimize the cost incurred by each electric company:
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min
u1
J1 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(2x21 + 7x
2
2 + u
2
1 + u
2
2) dt
min
u2
J2 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(3x21 + 8x
2
2 + u
2
1 + u
2
2) dt
s.t. x˙ =
 x2
x21 + u1 + u2

− 1 ≤ u1 ≤ 1
x2 + u2 ≤ 1
x(0) = x0
x(3) = xfree
(6.8)
Here, x ∈ R2 is the state vector of the game and u ∈ R2 is the control vector whose elements
consists of the control actions for Player 1 and Player 2.
6.4 Results and Discussion
Note: Both example problems presented here are solved using MATLAB’s fmincon function
with SQP solver.
The duopolistic competition problem as well as the nonlinear polynomial game problem were
solved using trapezoidal transcription method on a grid of 50 points, each. Both problems are
subjected to either mixed inequality constraints and/or control constraints.
Figure 7.1 a,b. show state and control trajectories of the two players in the duopolistic
competition. The control action of player 1 shows some non-smooth behavior due to control
saturation imposed via the mixed-inequality constraint in the system. As a check to validate
solution accuracy, we see that the control constraint in Figure 7.1 c. is respected at all times.
Figure 7.2 a,b. show state and control trajectories of the two players in the nonlinear
polynomial game. Unlike the previous game, this game is 2-dimensional. It also has multiple
constraints. The control actions of neither player shows any non-smooth behavior, which means
that the two players did not saturate their control. As a check to validate the accuracy of the
solution, we see that the control constraint in Figure 7.1 c. is again respected at all times.
The state and control trajectory data for both these problems will serve as the input to the
inverse dynamic game method to be presented next.
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Figure 6.1: This figure plots the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the duopolistic
competition. As can be seen, the constraint (c.) is satisfied throughout the trajectory.
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Figure 6.2: This figure plots the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the nonlinear
polynomial game. As can be seen, the constraints (c.) are satisfied throughout the trajectory.
Chapter 7
Inverse Dynamic Games
Since non-zero sum behaviors often arise in real-world settings, control systems that interact with
humans should ideally account for this non-zero sum behavior. In particular, ideal controllers
would exploit cooperation while protecting against adversarial behavior. However, a challenge
that immediately arises is that the costs of interacting agents are often not known. In order to
design control systems that account for cooperation and competition, systematic methods for
modeling the costs would be beneficial.
Inverse dynamic games is the analogous problem to inverse optimal control, only in this,
multiple objectives as well as multiple players may be involved. In this chapter, we present a
general framework to solve nonzero-sum inverse dynamic game problems by showing that they
can be reduced to decoupled residual minimization problems of individual players.
7.1 Problem Formulation for Inverse Differential Games
Recall from the previous chapter that a dynamic game problem can be stated as:
Ji(ui, u−i) = minimize
ui
∫ tf
t0
cTi φi(t, x(t), u1(t), ..., uN (t)) dt
s.t. x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))
gi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)) ≤ 0
x(0) = xstart
x(tf ) = free
(7.1)
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where i ∈ {1, ..., N} are the N players with their associated cost functions Ji, ui is the
control action of player i and u−i is the control action of every other player. All the players are
subjected to the dynamics f and constraints gi.
Since at a Nash equilibrium, every player i must simultaneously minimize their own per-
formance index Ji, we use the necessary conditions (P1-P6) listed in the previous chapter to
formulate an inverse dynamic game problem.
The co-state equations for each player can be written more explicitly as
−p˙i(t) = cTi ∇xφ(t, x, ui, u−i) + pTi ∇xf(t, x, ui, u−i)µTi ∇xg(t, x, ui, u−i)
pi(tf ) = 0
(7.2)
0 = cTi ∇uiφi(t, x, ui, u−i) + pTi ∇uif(t, x, ui, u−i) + µTi ∇uigi(t, x, ui, u−i) (7.3)
Now that we have necessary optimality conditions for every player in the game, setting
p˙i = vi(t) zi(t) =

ci
pi(t)
µi(t)
 (7.4)
the residual function in the case of dynamic games can be defined as (analogous to the case of
optimal control)
ri(zi(t), vi(t)) =
∇xφi
∣∣∣T
(x,ui,u−i)
∇xf
∣∣∣T
(x,ui,u−i)
∇xgi
∣∣∣T
(x,ui,u−i)
∇uiφ
∣∣∣T
(x,u,u−i)
∇uif
∣∣∣T
(x,ui,u−i)
∇uigi
∣∣∣T
(x,ui,u−i)
 zi(t) +
I
0
 vi(t) (7.5)
Since each player independently minimizes its own performance index, the residual function
of every player, as defined by (7.5), is minimized independently too. This is a key insight in
our development of the inverse dynamic games method. No matter how strongly coupled the
dynamic game is, the performance index of every player can be computed by solving decoupled
residual minimization problems.
More formally, the performance index of every player i can be imputed by solving the corre-
sponding residual optimization problem:
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minimize
zi(t),vi(t)
∫ tf
t0
||ri(zi(t), vi(t))||2 dt
s.t. p˙i(t) = vi(t)
pi(tf ) = 0
µi(t) ≥ 0
µi(t)
T gi(t, x(t), ui(t)) = 0
(7.6)
Note again that this is a convex optimal control problem with input vi(t) and state zi(t) and
can be solved efficiently. This residual minimization problem can also be extended to handle
multiple observations of a given player by following similar developments as shown in the case
of inverse optimal control method (5.13).
7.2 Simulations
This section presents the same example problems from the previous chapter, but this time they
will be used to implement inverse dynamic game method discussed in this chapter. A description
of the two examples is provided again for convenience.
1) Duopolistic competition
min
u1
J1 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(x2 + 2u21) dt
min
u2
J2 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(4x2 + u22)
s.t. x˙ = x+ u1 + u2
x+ u1 + 5 ≤ 0
x(0) = x0
x(3) = xfree
(7.7)
66
2) Nonlinear polynomial game
min
u1
J1 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(2x21 + 7x
2
2 + u
2
1 + u
2
2) dt
min
u2
J2 =
1
2
∫ 3
0
(3x21 + 8x
2
2 + u
2
1 + u
2
2) dt
s.t. x˙ =
 x2
x21 + u1 + u2

− 1 ≤ u1 ≤ 1
x2 + u2 ≤ 1
x(0) = x0
x(3) = xfree
(7.8)
7.3 Results and Discussion
Note: Both example problems presented here are solved using MATLAB’s fmincon function
with SQP solver.
Figure 7.1 a,b. show the state and control trajectories for the duopolistic game. As we can
see, the predicted state and control trajectories virtually lie on top of the actual simulated
trajectories. As a check on the validity of the inverse dynamic game method, we can also see
that dual constraint (c.) as well as complementary slackness condition (d.) are satisfied.
Figure 7.2 a,b. show the state and control trajectories for the non-linear polynomial game.
Here again, the predicted trajectories are in close agreement with the actual simulated trajec-
tories. As a check on the validity of the IOC method, we can see that dual constraint condition
(c.) is satisfied. However, the same cannot be said for the complementary slackness condition
(d.) as it is violated in the very beginning. Looking at how accurately the inverse game method
predicts the state and control trajectory, as well as the vanishing value of the residual function
(Table 7.1) this constraint violation can be attributed to numerical inaccuracies in the imple-
mentation. Another important thing to note is that the box constraint in this problem is handled
by breaking down the constraint gPlayer1into two separate constraints g1,P layer1, g2,P layer2.
While Figures 7.1-7.2 provide visual description of the results, Table 7.1 provides a quantita-
tive measure of the performance of the inverse dynamic game method, which is basically multiple
call to the inverse optimal control method as had been shown in the chapter. It compares the
67
Table 7.1: Comparison of weight vector from forward and inverse dynamic games
System
Feature vector
(φ)
Weight vector (from
forward method)
(c = ctrue)
Learned weight vector
(from inverse method)
(c = clearned)
Residual function
minimization (r)
Duopolistic competition
Player 1: φ1 = [x
2, u21]
Player 2: φ2 = [x
2, u22]
Player 1: [1, 2]
Player 2: [4, 1]
Player 1: [1, 2]
Player 2: [3.9997, 1]
Player 1: 1.04× 10−10
Player 2: 9.702× 10−07
Nonlinear polynomial game
Player 1: φ1 = [x
2
1, x
2
2, u
2
1, u
2
2]
Player 2: φ2 = [x
2
1, x
2
2, u
2
1, u
2
2]
Player 1: [2, 7, 1, 1]
Player 2: [3, 8, 1, 1]
Player 2: [2, 7, 1, 1]
Player 2: [3, 8, 1, 1]
Player 1: 6.524× 10−11
Player 2: 3.443× 10−12
true cost functions and the learned cost functions and also provides a value for the residual
function. The quality of the solution can be judged from its value of final residual function: the
lower the value of the residual, the better IOC method was able to recover the underlying cost
function.
Much of discussion from Chapter 5 about the inverse optimal control method applies equally
well in the case of inverse dynamic game method and is not repeated here to minimize redun-
dancy.
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c. Dual feasibility d. Complementary slackness
Figure 7.1: This figure compares the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the duopolistic
competition problem computed using true (actual) and learned (predicted) cost functions. As
can be seen, the computed costs are sufficiently accurate to reproduce the original trajectories.
We also see that the dual feasibility constraint (c.) as well complementary slackness (d.) are
satisfied. Here constraint g = x+ u1 + 5.
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c. Dual feasibility d. Complementary slackness
Figure 7.2: This figure compares the state (a.) and control (b.) trajectories for the nonlinear
polynomial game computed using true (actual) and learned (predicted) cost functions. As can
be seen, the computed costs are sufficiently accurate to reproduce the original trajectories. We
see that while the dual feasibility constraint (c.) is satisfied throughout the trajectory, the same
cannot be said for complementary slackness (d.), which is violated at the very beginning of the
trajectory. Here constraint g1,P layer1 = −uPlayer1 − 1, g2,P layer2 = uPlayer1 − 1, gPlayer2 =
x2 + uPlayer2 − 1
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we presented a control-theoretic method of solving constrained inverse optimal
control problems. We also provided a solution strategy, in the form of novel semi-direct method,
to solve constrained dynamic games. Finally, we extended the constrained optimal control
method to solve constrained inverse dynamic game problems. Throughout our work, we provided
several examples to test the efficacy of our methods, both visually (via plots) and quantitatively
(via tables).
We began by deriving necessary conditions of optimality for a nonlinear optimal control
problem using calculus of variations in Chapter 3. We then brought up the fact that almost
all nonlinear optimal control problems cannot be solved analytically or in closed-form, so we
presented two methods, namely, trapezoidal collocation and pseudospectral collocation, for nu-
merical solutions of optimal control problems in Chapter 4. These two chapters had in mind a
beginner student or a non-expert who’ll able to read and understand the text without having
to spend an enormous amount of time understanding technicalities and heavy jargon present in
the current literature. The examples provided at the end of Chapter 4 were not only used for
demonstrating the results from implementing the two numerical schemes, but were also used for
generating optimal trajectory data which was used in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, we extended the
method of Johnson et al. [18] to impute cost functions from optimal trajectory data when the
dynamic systems were subjected to mixed and/or control constraints. The examples provided
at the end of the chapter not only accurately predicted the underlying cost function, but the
residual function associated with problem gave us a metric to judge the quality of the solution.
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Chapter 6 extended single objective optimal control problem to multi-objective dynamic game
problem and provided a novel method for computing Nash equilibrium, which is regarded as
an optimal strategy. This method, called as semi-direct method, used necessary conditions of
optimality developed in Chapter 3 and turned them into a feasibility problem for the dynamic
game. The feasibility problem is then solved using a standard NLP solver. We again employed
the examples used in this chapter not only for the purpose of demonstration of the efficacy of
the method, but also to generate optimal trajectory data to be used in Chapter 7. Finally,
in Chapter 7, we showed that the inverse dynamic game problem can be reduced to decoupled
inverse optimal control problems. These problems can then be solved using our extended inverse
optimal control method developed in Chapter 5.
While the work presented in this thesis addresses some of the gaps mentioned in the in-
troductory chapter (Chapter 1), there are some limitations to it. Firstly, in Chapter 4, we
assume that the solution which results from solving an optimal control problem is a minimal
solution. However, because we only used the necessary conditions of optimality without taking
into consideration sufficient conditions, we cannot guarantee that this solution is necessarily
a minimum. Again, in Chapter 6, we assume that the solution that results from solving the
optimization problem is a Nash equilibrium. However, without establishing the sufficient con-
ditions, we cannot guarantee that this is equilibrium is necessarily a minimum of the problem.
Moreover, we do not discuss whether this Nash equilibrium is always possible nor do we talk
about its uniqueness. Finally, the Chapters 6-7 only talk about nonzero-sum dynamic games.
For future work, we would like to study stochastic systems as well as systems with partially
known dynamics, neither of which is dealt in this work. We would also like to use the methods
we developed in this thesis to important systems such as swarm navigation of human drivers.
Lastly, we would like to extend our nonzero-sum dynamic framework to solve zero-sum dynamic
game problems.
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Appendix A
Glossary
While care has been taken in this thesis to not excessively rely on the use of jargon, this cannot
always be achieved. This appendix defines jargon terms in a glossary.
• Calculus of variations – A branch of mathematics that deals with function minimization.
• Direct transcription – A procedure to convert a continuous time infinite dimensional
functional optimization problem to a finite dimensional parameter optimization problem.
• Feature vector – Part of the cost function that contains different features such as squares
of states, controls, etc.
• Functional – A functional whose input is another function (in contrast to a function
whose input is a point)
• Nash equilibrium – A strategy in non-cooperative zero-sum games where no player can
do better by unilaterally changing their strategy given the strategy of every other player.
• Parameter optimization – A problem which involves optimization over decision vari-
ables which are typically real numbers (in contrast to optimization over functions).
• Sequential Quadratic Programming – A nonlinear optimization solver which is used
after a problem is transcribed from functional optimization to parameter optimization.
• Weight vector – Part of the cost function that indicates relative importance of different
features present in the feature vector.
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